According to socialists, Berger and Lukmann (2008) the construction of social reality is an ongoing, dynamic process that is (and must be) reproduced by people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it. Because social constructs as facets of reality and objects of knowledge are not "given" by nature, they must be constantly maintained and re-affirmed in order to persist.
John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality is an examination of the relation between physical and social reality. Searle describes how physical reality provides a foundation for the construction of social reality, and investigates the nature of the rules which constitute and regulate the social world. He defends Realism (the theory that there is a real world existing independently of our ideas and representations) as necessary for our understanding of social reality, and he also defends the Correspondence Theory of Truth (the theory that statements are true if they correspond to facts in the real world). Searle distinguishes between "brute" physical facts and mental facts. Brute physical facts include such things as rivers, trees, and mountains. Mental facts include such things as perceptions, feelings, and judgments. Mental facts are ultimately caused by physical facts, in that mental facts depend on physical and biological functions which are required for consciousness. The physical and biological processes which are necessary for consciousness enable conscious individuals to recognize physical and mental facts. Thus, mental facts are based on physical facts, and both physical and mental facts are required for the construction of social reality.
According to Searle, mental facts may be intentional or nonintentional, depending on whether or not they are directed at something. Intentionality is a quality of representations whereby they are about, or directed at, something, Intentional mental facts may be recognized by a single individual, or may be recognized by multiple individuals. Thus, intentional mental facts may become social facts when they are recognized by many individuals. Social facts are facts which are generally agreed upon, and which have collective intentionality. Searle maintains that brute facts are objective, and that social facts may be both subjective and objective. Brute facts are objective, in that they do not depend on our attitude about them. For example, mountains and valleys are physical facts, no matter what attitude we take toward them. On the other hand, social facts depend on the attitudes which taken toward them. For example, the value of a five-dollar bill is a social fact which depends on our agreement that a five-dollar bill is worth something. However, social facts may be objective when they are commonly accepted, and when they are not a matter of individual preference or opinion. For example, the duty of a policeman to enforce the law may be classified as an objective social fact.
According to Searle, social facts may be epistemically objective (in that they are not a matter of individual preference or opinion) but may be ontologically subjective (in that they depend for their existence on being agreed upon as facts). Searle also explains that brute facts may be status-indicators of social facts. For example, a driver’s license is a brute fact which indicates the social fact that a person may legally drive a car. A status-function may be imposed on a social fact by collective intentionality. For example, the fact that a person is driving a car without a license may be assigned a status-function by collective intentionality. Searle describes how status-functions may also be institutional facts. Institutional facts are social facts which depend for their existence on social institutions. For example, marriages, businesses, property, and governments are institutional facts. Brute facts (such as baseball stadiums or government buildings) may be status-indicators of institutional facts (such as baseball teams or governments).
According to Searle, social rules may be regulative or constitutive. Regulative rules may regulate an activity (such as driving a car), while constitutive rules may create the possibility of an activity (such as playing a baseball game). Constitutive rules provide a structure for institutional facts. Institutional facts ultimately depend on brute facts, that is, social reality is ultimately defined by physical reality. For example, in order to say that a particular player in a football game scored a touchdown, we must have confirmed the occurrence of a physical event which we called a touchdown. Searle expains that brute facts have logical priority over institutional facts. If there are no brute facts to provide a foundation for social facts, then there is no logical basis for the structure of social reality. Searle explains that both physical facts and mental facts are constitutive elements of social reality. Intentional facts may become social facts by collective intentionality. Social facts are collective intentional facts, and may become functional facts when they assign functions to physical or mental phenomena. Functional facts which assign status-functions to phenomena may also be institutional facts. Institutional facts may include linguistic and non-linguistic facts. The structure of social reality is a hierarchy in which logical functions are assigned to social facts, and in which status-functions are determined by collective intentionality.
According to Searle, intentionality functions against a Background of mental capacities which are nonintentional or preintentional. Background mental abilities are necessary for intentional states of function. Searle contends that Realism, or the viewpoint that reality exists independently of our ideas and representations, is a necessary part of the Background. Searle does not explain how differing views of social reality or differing representations of collective intentionality may become a source of social conflict. He does not describe how social reality may be viewed differently by individuals from different groups or classes of society. He also does not attempt to extensively discuss how phenomena which are viewed as facts by some people may not be viewed as facts by other people. According to his view, physical reality is the same for all of us, and exists independently of our representations. The structure of social reality may involve the assignment of functions to subjective facts, but social reality must ultimately be based on objective facts.
Seale’s definition of a social fact is that it is a collective intentional fact, i.e. an intentional fact which is agreed upon by many people and which is not a matter of subjective preference or attitude. However, a social fact may be agreed upon by a large number of people, and may still not be agreed upon by a large number of people. It may not be possible to determine exactly how many people must agree upon a social fact before it becomes an objective fact. It may also be important to fully investigate the agreement or disagreement of different forms of collective intentionality, if we are to recognize the differences which may occur in our views of social reality, and if we are to achieve social harmony and understanding. Searle’s theory of intentionality is thus an important development in the philosophy of mind and in understanding the metaphysics of social reality.
